Abstract-The mobile traffic explosion has caused spectrum shortage and polarization of data usage among users, which will eventually decrease user welfare (UW) in mobile communication services. Governments around the world are planning to make more spectrum available for mobile broadband use, and the key policy issue is to find an efficient spectrum allocation method that will improve UW. In this paper, we propose a data subsidy scheme where the regulator offers a spectrum price discount to mobile network operators (MNOs) in return for imposing the responsibility of providing a predefined data amount to users free of charge. To analyze the subsidy effect, we adopt the two-stage approach of Cournot and Bertrand competition and find a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the competition. An interesting observation is that the increase in UW does not involve MNO profit (MP) loss and that the increasing amount is higher than the regulator's expenses for implementing the data subsidy scheme. Most of the paper concerns the duopoly competition, which is finally extended to the general case.
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I. INTRODUCTION

W
ITH the proliferation of smartphones, tablets, and laptops, global mobile data traffic continues to grow dramatically, with the expectation of being tenfold between 2014 and 2019 [1] . To bridge the gap between this soaring traffic demand and current network capacity, mobile network operators (MNOs) intend to purchase additional spectrum amount as a straightforward way to enhance the network capacity. Due to the scarcity of available spectrum, however, MNOs compete with each other to get more spectrum. This provokes increasing spectrum price, which will eventually lead to a high service price to users. We recently investigated price competition between two MNOs and suggested regulation rules for achieving Pareto optimal equilibria [2] , [3] .
One of the remaining challenges facing the tremendous increase in mobile data traffic is the polarization of data usage among users. Data traffic usage behavior follows the Pareto principle, where 20% of heavy users consume 80% of the total traffic [4] . Some people cannot use network services because they are economically unstable or live in rural areas. In this context, the European Commission recommended the Universal Service Obligation (USO), under which MNOs ensure that their services are accessible to all people within a reasonable price range [5] . Since Switzerland first imposed the USO in 2008, many countries have adopted it. Although the USO reduces the regional imbalance in traffic usage, the imbalance from income inequality still remains. The aim of this paper is how to make the best use of scarce spectrum resources to improve user welfare (UW) within mobile communication services, from the regulator's perspective. Regulators around the world are planning to make more spectrum available for mobile broadband use. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) released the National Broadband Plan, which calls for 300-MHz additional spectrum in the short term and 500 MHz in the long term [6] . In these circumstances, a key issue is to find an efficient spectrum allocation method that will improve service quality and UW. One argument suggests providing the additional spectrum in unlicensed form. However, a previous work [7] pointed out that additional unlicensed spectrum allocation might be inefficient, owing to the high congestion level caused by many free-riding users (i.e., the tragedy of commons).
Motivated by these discussions, in this paper, we propose a data subsidy scheme for improving UW while guaranteeing profits to MNOs. In this scheme, the regulator offers a spectrum price discount to MNOs in return for imposing the responsibility of providing a predefined data amount to users free of charge. "Limited" free data service plays important roles in both increasing UW and avoiding the tragedy of commons by driving users to consume data rationally. To quantify the effect of the data subsidy scheme under a competitive environment, we formulate the interactions among the regulator, MNOs, and users as a two-stage competition composed of the Cournot and Bertrand models [8] . In the Cournot stage [9] , MNOs compete with each other by purchasing spectrum to improve their network capacities. In the Bertrand stage [10] , on the other hand, MNOs optimally price their services to maximize their profits based on their limited network capacities.
The main contributions and results of this paper are summarized in the following.
MNOs should purchase spectrum to maximize their profits, we focus on how the regulator should allocate spectrum to improve UW. Moreover, we study characteristics of the competitive mobile communication markets under two practical scenarios: 1) a duopoly, in which two MNOs compete with each other; and 2) an oligopoly, in which multiple MNOs compete with each other.
• We apply the Cournot and Bertrand competition models to investigate the interactions among the regulator, MNOs, and users. Using the backward induction method, we derive a Nash equilibrium (NE) in each of two stages separately and a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to deal with the cyclic dependence between them.
• We propose a data subsidy scheme to improve UW within mobile communication services. Through analytical and numerical results, we show that the increase in UW does not involve MNO profit (MP) loss (i.e., win-win to users and MNOs). Moreover, we identify some such cases where the gain from the data subsidy scheme is higher than the regulator's expenses (i.e., cost-effectiveness).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We briefly review the related work in Section II. We describe two subsidization schemes and the two-stage game framework, and explain characteristics of user demand in Section III. We analyze the profit maximization of two MNOs in Section IV. In this section, there is no subsidy scheme applied, whereas in Section V, we adopt the data subsidy scheme. We extend our model into the oligopoly in Section VI. We provide numerical examples to validate the proposed studies in Section VII. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Game theory has been widely applied in mobile communication markets, particularly for studying strategic interactions among multiple decision-makers with conflicting interests [11] , [12] . For the provision of network services, most of the prior works have primarily concerned with the pricing interactions between MNOs and users [13] - [16] . Saraydar et al. [13] studied the price-based resource-allocation problem of a single MNO. Niyato and Hossain [14] proposed a two-tier price competition model between two MNOs. The price competition among MNOs to attract more users was investigated in [15] and [16] . However, neither of them considered the acquisition of radio spectrum to be allocated, which means a total amount of resources are given as an external value.
The joint optimization of spectrum acquisition and service pricing plays a decisive role in understanding how the competitive mobile communication markets are formed. This is because spectrum acquisition and service pricing strategies are tightly intertwined, thereby changing the total user demand for network services. In [17] , the economic models of Cournot and Bertrand were adopted to investigate the spectrum and price competition between two MNOs. By taking into account MNOs' heterogeneity in spectrum costs and users' heterogeneity in transmission power and channel conditions, in [18] , a comprehensive analytical study of MNOs' spectrum acquisition and single pricing strategies was conducted. The follow-up work in [19] proposed differentiated pricing schemes to further enhance the profit of MNOs. Auction-based spectrumallocation mechanisms are proposed in [20] - [23] . However, all the previous works focused on how to maximize the total profit of MNOs, whereas the work in this paper focuses on how to allocate spectrum for improving UW, from the regulator's perspective.
So far, few papers have studied a spectrum-allocation policy with consideration of UW [24] - [26] . In [24] and [25] , we proposed spectrum policies and subsidization schemes to improve UW. However, our previous works only considered a monopoly case, without addressing competition among MNOs. Chen et al. [26] suggested a new spectrum-allocation scheme to balance the regulator's spectrum sales revenue and UW but did not explicitly characterize their relation nor its impact on the total profit of MNOs. One of the goals of this paper is to fill this gap and provide useful insight for development of an efficient spectrum-allocation policy.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Two Subsidization Schemes in Mobile Communication Services
A simple and direct method for improving UW is to give users money as a subsidy. We call this the price subsidy scheme, where the regulator gives an equal price subsidyp to all users that consume network services. Every user's willingness-to-pay increases and the total traffic demand changes. Fig. 1 shows the change in the total traffic demand with the price subsidy scheme. The original demand curve is translated byp, parallel to the price axis. An optimal action of MNOs is to absorb all the price subsidy amount by simply increasing their service prices byp. Therefore, this subsidy scheme may not increase UW in most cases [27] .
Our proposed data subsidy scheme is shown in Fig. 2 , where MNOs should provide a predefined amount of data to users free of charge. The free data amount is decided by the regulator. The data subsidy reduces the total traffic demand for charged network services, decreasing MNO revenue. To compensate for this, the regulator offers a spectrum price discount to MNOs. From the regulator's perspective, an interesting problem is to determine the subsidy amount and the discount rate for the spectrum. This will be analyzed and discussed in Sections V-VII. The key notations of this paper are listed in Table I .
B. Two-Stage Competition
Consider a service area covered by two MNOs. Let i ∈ {1, 2} denote the decision-maker index. Then, −i represents its competitor. The two MNOs compete with each other to attract more users and to maximize their profits. Fig. 3 shows the twostage competition model by the two MNOs.
In the Cournot stage, each MNO purchases spectrum to increase its network capacity. Let w i and k i denote MNO i's spectrum purchasing amount and network capacity, respectively. The network capacity is determined by not only the spectrum amount but also by the spectral efficiency in the service area. We assume both MNOs use the orthogonal frequency-division multiple-access technology to avoid mutual interference among their users, but their technological prowess can be different. Then, MNO i's network capacity is
where α i denotes the spectral efficiency (b/s/Hz) of MNO i's network. We denote the unit spectrum cost by c. Then, MNO i's spectrum cost is equal to cw i . The higher network capacity enables MNOs to provide more network services, but it costs more.
In the Bertrand stage, MNOs compete with each other by their service prices under the given capacities (determined in the Cournot stage). Let p i and p −i denote MNO i's service price and its competitor's, respectively. The demand for MNO i is a function of p i and
C. User Demand
We consider a continuum of users, as in [28] - [30] , that decides whether to purchase a network service from one of the two MNOs or not. This continuum model, which is widely used in mobile communication networks, approximates the reality well if there are a sufficiently large number of users so that a single user is negligible [30] . Users have different preferences for the network services. We characterize such heterogeneity by willingness to pay θ ∈ [0,p], wherep denotes the maximum willingness to pay. If a user with willingness to pay θ purchases MNO i's network service, its net utility will be θ − p i .
We can now describe user demand as follows: First, user demand for MNO i is a decreasing function of its service price. For mathematical tractability, we assume that user willingness to pay θ is uniformly distributed [15] , [31] . This assumption allows us to capture the main insights of the paper within a tractable model (i.e., closed-form solutions of the optimal decisions in each stage). Like many other studies in network economics [32] - [35] , we will numerically show that the main insights still hold with more general distributions of θ in Section VII. Under the uniform distribution, d i (p i , p −i ) becomes a linearly decreasing function of p i . This follows from the fact that d i (p i , p −i ) is derived from mathematical integration of the willingness-to-pay distribution, and the lower bound of the integration interval is determined by p i . Second, the user demand for MNO i is affected by its competitor's service price. Following the previous studies [16] , [18] , for simplicity, we assume that each user would churn from one MNO to another without incurring switching costs. If p i is lower than higher than p −i , then users prefer MNO −i. If MNO −i has enough capacity to satisfy user demand,
becomes the residual demand that cannot be served by MNO −i due to capacity limitation. In this case, the residual demand depends on the manner in which user demand is rationed. In this paper, we assume the efficientrationing rule in which users with the highest willingness to pay will be served first [8] . Note that this rule is called efficient in the sense that it maximizes UW. In the equal price case, each user is indifferent between the two MNOs. We assume that the demand for MNO i is proportional to its share of network capacity [15] . The rationale behind this assumption is that it maximizes the total profit of the two MNOs while satisfying incentive compatibility constraint for each MNO [36] . Then,
where the given parameterd denotes the maximum demand. 
IV. DUOPOLY COMPETITION
We analyze the conventional competition (no subsidy) between two operators, based on the two-stage model and the game-theoretic approach. Our analysis here is extended to the data subsidy case in Section V to derive the gain of the subsidy scheme compared to the conventional competition.
Let us start with the Bertrand stage, where the capacity k i = α i w i is a given value.
A. Bertrand Stage: Price Competition
MNO i's profit maximization problem in the Bertrand stage is formulated as follows:
Note that w i is a given value, and the network capacity (k i = α i w i ) and the total cost (cw i ) are fixed. The MNO maximizes
We derive MNO i's optimal price, as summarized in the following lemmas.
Lemma 1: In the case that MNO i's price (p i ) is lower than its competitor's price (p −i ), the optimal price (p * i ) is
where ε is a small positive value.
The MNO cannot support demand higher than its network capacity. Reflecting this, we rewrite the revenue as follows:
In the minimum operator of the revenue, the left-hand side of (2) is a linear function whose slope is α i w i (MNO i's network capacity), and the right-hand side of (2) is a quadratic function whose maximum is at p i =p/2. The intersection of these functions is at 
Proof: Similar to the proof on Lemma 1, we calculate MNO i's revenue in this case (p i > p −i ) as follows:
In the minimum operator of the revenue, the left-hand side of (3) is a linear function whose slope is α i w i , and the righthand side of (3) is a quadratic function whose maximum is at
The intersection of these functions is
Otherwise, the optimal solution is p * i = p −i + ε. MNO i's optimal price p * i is affected by the competitor's price p −i , and there will be a strategic interaction between the two MNOs. Therefore, we use the NE concept to predict the result of the strategic interaction [11] . NE represents an equilibrium point of a noncooperative game, where no one has anything to gain by changing their own strategy unilaterally. Using Lemmas 1 and 2, we find a NE in the Bertrand stage as follows.
Proposition 1: In the Bertrand stage where both MNOs' spectrum amounts (w 1 and w 2 ) are given, there is a NE (p NE ) in prices
Proof:
In (4), the demand is equal to the network capacity. In this case, even if MNO i lowers its price, its revenue will not increase because MNO i cannot serve more traffic due to the capacity limitation. If MNO i applies a strategy to raise its price, then the optimal choice is to increase the price by ε, but this leads to the revenue decrease (see Lemma 2) . Therefore, MNO i has no motivation to deviate from the price
Proposition 1 says that the higher network capacity in the Cournot stage will lead to the lower equilibrium price in the Bertrand stage. An interesting observation is that both MNOs always choose the same equilibrium price, although their network capacities may differ from each other. It reflects the fact that every MNO cuts the service price down as low as its competitor's. This symmetric pricing structure coincides with the existing results [15] , [18] .
B. Cournot Stage: Capacity (Spectrum) Competition
In the Cournot stage, MNO i's profit maximization problem is
where MNOs determine the spectrum amount to purchase, which affects the NE in the Bertrand stage. With Proposition 1, we rewrite the profit maximization problem as follows:
of which the optimal solution is summarized in the following lemma. Lemma 3: If the competitor's spectrum amount w −i is given, MNO i's optimal spectrum amount (w * i ) is
Proof: The objective function (5) is a quadratic function, and we can find the optimal solution by solving the first-order condition.
With Lemma 3, we find an NE in the Cournot stage as follows.
Proposition 2: In the Cournot stage, there is a NE (w NE ) in spectrum amounts, i.e.,
Proof: Using the fact that the intersection of all players' optimal strategies becomes a NE, the following equations from Lemma 3 should be satisfied:
Therefore, we can find a NE by solving these simultaneous linear equations. In Propositions 1 and 2, we derived a NE in each of the Cournot and Bertrand stages separately. However, these two stages are interlinked, and the equilibrium should be integrated. In game theory, a SPE is a refined concept of NE used in multistage games, which represents a NE of every stage (or subgame) of the original game [11] . No player has anything to gain by changing its own strategy in SPE, and the strategies in SPE will be the outcome of the strategic interaction between players. Therefore, to describe characteristics of the two-stage competition market, we need to find a SPE. To this end, we use the backward induction method that aims to solve a multistage game backwards from the last stage of the game. With Propositions 1 and 2, we can find a SPE in the two-stage competition as follows.
Proposition 3: In the two-stage duopoly competition, there is a SPE (w SPE , p SPE ), i.e., Proof: We first check that the SPE represents a NE in the last stage (i.e., the Bertrand stage) of the two-stage competition game as follows:
Equation (6) for all i (see Proposition 2).
Proposition 3 says that each MNO purchases a different amount of spectrum, although they adopt the equal pricing strategy due to the fierce competition. Using (1), we see that the demand for each MNO is equal to its own network capacity in the SPE. The high spectrum cost causes both MNOs to raise their service prices. Consequently, some users cannot afford to consume network services, which will eventually decrease overall UW.
C. Welfare Analysis
To quantify each player's outcome, let us define MP, UW, and regulator revenue (RR). MP is the sum of both MNOs' profits (revenues minus costs). UW is the sum of all users' utilities. The net utility of a user is equal to his willingness to pay minus the MNO's service price. If the user consumes neither of MNOs' network service, then his utility is zero. To calculate UW, we plot the total demand in duopoly competition (see Fig. 5 ). In the figure, points B and D denote the service price and the sum of both MNOs' network capacities in the SPE, respectively. Then, the area of triangle ABC is equal to UW. RR is the regulator's spectrum sales revenue. MP, UW, and RR are expressed as follows:
. Fig. 6 . Total traffic demand for network services in the data subsidy scheme.
Assuming spectral efficiencies of both networks are the same (i.e., α 1 = α 2 = α), we get MP, UW, and RR as simple closedform formulas, i.e.,
From (7) and (8), we observe that increase of the unit spectrum cost c decreases both MP and UW. This is because the two MNOs reduce spectrum purchasing amount and raise service prices in return (see Proposition 3). On the other hand, technological innovation that increases the spectral efficiency brings positive effects to both MP and UW.
V. PROPOSED DATA SUBSIDY SCHEME
In the data subsidy scheme, MNOs should provide a predefined data amountd to users free of charge. The data subsidy reduces the total traffic demand for charged network services, which will eventually decrease MNO revenues (see Fig. 6 ). On the other hand, the spectrum price discount cuts down MNO costs. We denote the discount rate by δ. From the regulator perspective, an important problem is how to determined and δ for improving UW without any loss in MP. Note that two MNOs may cooperate with each other, i.e., as a single decisionmaker, to maximize their total profits in the data subsidy scheme. However, the key hurdle for cooperative games lies on additional signalization and agreements between them, which makes it difficult to realize in practice [37] . Therefore, our approach still focuses on the NE concept to provide practical insights into the design of the proposed data subsidy scheme.
Following several steps similar to Proposition 3, we can find a SPE in the data subsidy scheme as follows.
Proposition 4:
In the two-stage duopoly competition, if the regulator adopts the data subsidy scheme, then there is a SPE (w
Proof: In the data subsidy scheme, the maximum demand for charged network services and the unit spectrum cost becomē d −d and (1 − δ)c, respectively. Excepting this change, steps for finding a SPE in the data subsidy scheme are equal to those in the conventional scheme (see Proposition 3). Therefore, we can find a SPE in the data subsidy scheme by replacingd with d −d and c with (1 − δ)c in Proposition 3.
Proposition 4 says that, in the data subsidy scheme, both MNOs choose the same equilibrium price, which is lower than that in the conventional scheme. With the spectrum price discount (δ), MNOs purchase more spectrum and lower their service prices to attract users.
Assuming that spectral efficiencies of both networks are α and from Proposition 4, we can calculate MP, UW, and RR in the data subsidy scheme as follows:
where subscript D denotes the data subsidy scheme. In the data subsidy scheme, the regulator can control MP and UW for his purpose by adjusting the data subsidy amountd and the spectrum price discount rate δ. The regulator can increase UW by just giving the spectrum price discount without any data subsidy (i.e.,d = 0) requirement, which always involves the increase in MP. On the other hand, the regulator can adopt the data subsidy scheme with no spectrum price discount (i.e., δ = 0) to increase UW only. In this case, there will be an MP loss. The comprehensive effects of the data subsidy scheme will be discussed in Section VII.
VI. EXTENSION TO OLIGOPOLY
Here, we extend the results from the duopoly into the multiple MNO case (i.e., oligopoly). As the mobile communication industry continues to evolve into an oligopoly market in most countries, this extension is a natural step to examine a wide range of different outcomes in the oligopoly competition.
Let N denote the number of MNOs. The decision-maker index is i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. On the other hand, its competitor index −i becomes a set, which includes all the MNOs except MNO i. For the convenience of mathematical expressions, we define other sets −i e and −i l . Set −i e includes the competitors whose service price levels are equal to MNO i's. On the other hand, set −i l includes the competitors whose service price levels are lower than MNO i's. In the oligopoly competition, the user demand for MNO i changes from (1), i.e.,
Following several steps similar to the proofs of Propositions 1, 2, and 3, we can find the SPE in the oligopoly competition as follows.
Proposition 5: In the two-stage oligopoly competition, there is a SPE (w
Proof: First, we check whether the SPE represents a NE in the Bertrand stage, i.e.,
Using (13) and (14), we get the following:
Equation (15) shows the demand for MNO i is equal to its network capacity (market clearing). In this case, even if MNO i lowers or raises its price, its revenue will not increase for the same reason as the duopoly case (see Proposition 1). Therefore, the SPE represents a NE in the Bertrand stage. Second, we check whether the SPE also represents a NE in the Cournot stage. Similar to the duopoly case, the profit maximization problem in the oligopoly Cournot competition is
The only difference from the duopoly case is that the competitor index −i becomes a set. The objective function (16) is a quadratic function of which the optimal solution (w *
By the fact that a NE is the intersection of all players' optimal strategies, we can find the condition for becoming a NE (w NE O;i ) in the Cournot stage as follows:
The SPE satisfies this condition. Therefore, the SPE represents a NE in the Cournot stage. Proposition 5 characterizes the SPE in the oligopoly competition. As the number of MNOs increases, it leads to the higher network capacity by purchasing more spectrum in the Cournot stage. This higher network capacity induces the higher demand for network services but intensifies the price-down competition among MNOs to attract more users. Thus, the equilibrium price in the Bertrand stage becomes lower with the number of MNOs.
We then investigate each player's outcome in the oligopoly competition. Following the same steps in Section IV-C, we can express MP O , UW O , and RR O , as follows:
where subscript O denotes the oligopoly competition.
Assuming that spectral efficiencies of all the MNOs' networks are equal to α and from Proposition 5, the given equations can be reduced to the following simple-closed form:
From (20) and (21), we observe that UW and RR increase with the number of MNOs. As noted, this stems from the lower equilibrium price and the higher network capacity. On the other hand, MP decreases with the number of MNOs. Although the higher network capacity and the lower equilibrium price induce the higher demand for network services, it is not sufficient to avoid the reduction of MP due to the more severe competition among MNOs. Overall, the regulator can improve UW by facilitating the entry of new MNOs, at the expense of the decrease in the MNOs' total profits. In the oligopoly competition, we also apply the data subsidy scheme. We can find a SPE in the data subsidy scheme as follows: 
Proof: In the data subsidy scheme, the maximum demand for charged network services and the unit spectrum cost becomē d −d and (1 − δ)c, respectively. Excepting this change, steps for finding a SPE in the data subsidy scheme are equal to that in the conventional scheme (see Proposition 5) . Therefore, we can find a SPE in the data subsidy scheme by replacingd withd −d and c with (1 − δ)c in Proposition 5. Assuming that spectral efficiencies of all MNOs' networks are α and from Proposition 6, we can calculate MP, UW, and RR in the data subsidy scheme (oligopoly) as follows:
where subscript OD denotes the data subsidy scheme in the oligopoly competition. In the data subsidy scheme, the regulator can further increase UW by just adjusting the data subsidy amountd with no spectrum price discount (i.e., δ = 0), which always involves the decrease in MP. On the other hand, the regulator can control the spectrum price discount δ with no data subsidy (i.e.,d = 0) requirement not only to offset the MP loss but to increase UW as well. Therefore, the regulator should jointly consider the entry of new MNOs and the data subsidy scheme for improving UW more efficiently and for guaranteeing MP.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We give numerical examples to study several key properties of the proposed data subsidy scheme and to provide insights into the role of the regulator. Unless specified otherwise, the parameters are set to bep = 1, c = 0.4, δ = 0. gains decrease with the data subsidy level. The RR gain is always lower than 1 because the RR decrease is unavoidable due to the spectrum price discount. An interesting observation is that MNOs can profit more or avoid profit loss depending on specific subsidy requirement. For example, if the unit spectrum cost is c = 0.4, the spectrum price discount rate is δ = 0.2 and the data subsidy amount isd = 0.15d, then UW increases more than twice with no loss in MP.
Nevertheless, the regulator should check the important factor; the UW increase has to be as high as the regulator's expenses (i.e., RR decrease) on that increase. As shown in Fig. 8 , we identify some such cases where the amount of the UW increase is larger than the RR decrease for all data subsidy levels. 1 With a careful choice of the data subsidy amountd and the spectrum price discount δ, the data subsidy scheme would be a cost-effective way to increase UW. Fig. 9 shows MP, UW, and RR gains as a function of unit spectrum cost c. We observe that all the gains become larger as c increases. At the higher spectrum cost, MNOs raise service prices. Some users cannot afford to consume the network services, which lead to MP and UW decreases. By giving the spectrum discount and the data subsidy, however, MNOs increase the purchased spectrum amount, and more users consume the network services for free or at a reduced price. The spectrum discount positively affects RR gains by the sale of a large spectrum at a low unit margin of revenue. Therefore, all the gains become larger as c increases. The spectrum cost has been increasing recently, where we believe the data subsidy scheme is a strong means to each player.
So far, we assume that user willingness to pay θ is uniformly distributed. To identify that the main insights still hold if we relax the uniform distribution of θ, we adopt three additional distributions (f 1 (θ), f 2 (θ), and, f 3 (θ)) of θ, as in [3] and [38] , to represent typical user distributions as follows:
The first probability density function (pdf) (f 1 (θ)) comes from a general concave cumulative distribution function (cdf) of user willingness to pay θ, which indicates that the high willingness-to-pay users are minorities. The second pdf (f 2 (θ)) exemplifies a convex cdf, which represents that the high willingness-to-pay users are majorities. The last one (f 3 (θ)) comes from an S-shaped, which means that the intermediate willingness-to-pay users are majorities. Fig. 10 shows MP, UW, and RR gains as a function of the data subsidy level (d/d) with more general distributions f 1 (θ), f 2 (θ), and f 3 (θ). We still observe that the increase in UW does not involve MNO profit loss within appropriate subsidy requirements, even if we relax the uniform distribution assumption of θ.
To identify whether the proposed data subsidy scheme remains cost-effective with more general distributions of θ, the regulator should inspect that the amount of UW increase has to be as high as the amount of RR decrease. As shown in Fig. 11 , we identify some such cases where the data subsidy scheme would be a cost-effective way to increase UW.
To show the outcomes of the oligopoly competition and the data subsidy scheme jointly, we plot Fig. 12 . We observe that more competition increases UW and RR, although it decreases MP. It is worth noting that the UW gain from competition is relatively low. For example, even if the regulator allows the entry of eight additional MNOs (i.e., N = 10) in the duopoly competition, twofold UW gain cannot be achieved. On the other hand, if the regulator adopts the data subsidy scheme, then it can be accomplished by just adding one more MNO (i.e., N = 3). In that case, MP and RR are slightly lower than those in the conventional duopoly but are not significant. This means the regulator can improve UW more efficiently by jointly allowing the entry of new MNOs and adopting the data subsidy scheme.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown that giving a price subsidy to users may not necessarily lead to an increase in UW in mobile communication services. Therefore, we suggest a data subsidy scheme as an alternative, where the regulator offers a spectrum price discount to MNOs in return for providing a predefined data amount to users free of charge. To analyze the subsidy effect, we formulate and solve optimization problems by applying the two-stage Cournot and Bertrand competition model. An interesting result is that the data subsidy scheme can increase UW even further without MNO profit loss. Moreover, we identify some such cases where the gain from the data subsidy scheme is higher than the regulator's expenses (i.e., cost-effectiveness).
In recent years, governments around the world released their plans to make more spectrum available for mobile broadband use. It is very important to create an efficient policy regarding new spectrum allocation that will improve UW. The data subsidy scheme deserves thoughtful consideration. Although our analytic results are derived under some assumptions for mathematical tractability, it will provide useful insight for development of an efficient spectrum-allocation policy.
